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Abstract





This paper conducts analysis on the effects of monetary policy under bounded ra-
tionality and parameter uncertainty. The model we examined here is New Keynesian
IS-Phillips curve of Christiano, Tranbandt, and Walentin (2011). Two assumptions we
added are that (i) central bank conducts monetary policy while private agents form
forward looking expectations via adaptive learning, and (ii) the central bank has un-
certainty about working capital channel parameter in the Phillips curve. Robust control
method and Bayesian update algorithm are used to model the central bank’s behavior
to deal with the parameter uncertainty. We examined which induces better outcome
between policy under perfect information, robust policy, and feedback (Bayesian) pol-
icy. Quantitative analysis shows that robust control policy achieves the best perfor-
mance among the three policies in discretion whereas it shows the worst performance
when commitment constraint is included. Also, performance of the perfect informa-
tion policy and the feedback policy with commitment outperform that of discretionary
policies.
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1 Introduction
In modern macroeconomic research, monetary policy as an economic stabilizer has
been a main issue. The important goal of the research is to figure out how to design
desirable monetary policies under various economic conditions. Through the seminal
work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), economics literature became aware of the dy-
namic consistency problem. That is, commitment policy may be infeasible, because
discretionary policy is dynamically consistent. In the work of Taylor (1993), widely
known Taylor principle is introduced. That is, an increase in inflation brings an in-
crease in the real interest rate.
The performance of the monetary policy has been widely studied in various eco-
nomic models. In addition, many of recent literatures for monetary economics have
been focused on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with nom-
inal rigidities and forward looking expectaions of economic agents, since the model
can explain the non-neutrality of money with microfounded structure. Typically, Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), MacCallum (1999), Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2001)
studied the effects of monetary policy under the New Keynesian DSGE model. Most
of these works have tried to find the optimal monetary policy that minimizes policy-
maker’s loss function, under the assumption of perfect rationality of economic agents.
Under this assumption, the central bank can achieve economic stability by considering
only the f undamentals of the economy.
However, more recently, there has been various works of monetary policy with the
model under the economic agents’ bounded rationality. The discussion on bounded
rationality in the economic model was initiated by Sims (1988) and Chung (1990), and
Sargent (1993) who studied conditions and approaches for bounded rationality. Re-
cently, the Learning model has received attention for its usefulness in explaining the ex-
pectation mechanism under bounded rationality and has been used for optimal mon-
etary policy under bounded rationality by Sargent (1999), Bullard and Mitra (2002),
Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003), Bullard and Cho
(2005), and Evans and Honkapohja (2008) etc. The main question of the learning liter-
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ature was whether the model can converge to the certain equilibrium (self-confirming
equilibrum) via learning and whether the equilibrium can reach the rational expecta-
tion equlibrium. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)’s well-known book Learning and Expec-
taions in Macroeconomics summarizes issues and solving techniques of learning models
in macroeconomics. From the point of view of monetary policy under learning, related
literatures suggest that the policymaker should consider the expectations of private
agents to stabilize the economy, even if the expectations are not from rational expecta-
tion.
In fact, in sync with bounded rationality framework, arguments about the possibil-
ities of misspeci f ication of economic models has emerged. To robustly deal with this
model misspecification, a new control theory, Robust Control has been applied to eco-
nomics. After the pioneering work of Hansen and Sargent (2001), there has been many
related research developing theories and applications of robust control in macroeco-
nomics. Giannoni (2002) showed the solving method to derive robust taylor rules in
the forward-looking macroeconomic model when there is the parameter uncertainty,
and showed that the robust taylor rules prescribe a stronger response of the interest
rate to fluctuations in inflation and output gap than the case in the without uncertainty.
Orphanides and Williams (2007) examined robust monetary policy when central bank
and private agents possess imperfect information about the structure of the economy,
using the structural model of natural rate Phillips curve and unemployment equation.
It shows that optimal policy under perfect information can perform poorly if informa-
tion is imperfect, and a more aggressive response to inflation, and a smaller response to
the perceived employment gap would be more efficient in this imperfect information.
The robust monetary policy and commitment problem is also has been examined. The
celebrated work of Woodford (2009) considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in
a classic New Keynesian model with cost-push shock in the Phillips curve, when the
central bank has uncertainty about privates’ expectations. In the work, by solving mul-
tiplier game between central bank and malevolent nature, it was found that a concern
for robustness increases the sensitivity of inflation to cost-push shocks under discre-
tionary policy, while it reduces the sensitivity to cost-push shocks under commitment.
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Also, it was found that the distortions from the discretionary policy become more se-
vere when the central bank allows for the possibility of near-rational expectations of
private agents, so that the importance of commitment is increased. Hansen and Sargent
(2008) combined techniques and issues of robust control in macroeconomics in a book
Robustness, and Hansen and Sargent (2011) introduces contents of the book compactly.
In this paper, we analysed learning and robust control problem together in the
New Keynesian DSGE model. The model used in the analysis is Christiano, Tranbandt,
and Walentin (2011)’s New Keynesian model with working capital channel and input
material which are not contained in the classic New Keynesian model. We assumed
bounded rationality of central bank and private agents. Central bank does not know
the working capital channel coefficient of the model, meanwhile private agents use
adaptive learning when they form forward looking expectations. We studied effect
of three types of monetary policy, optimal control under perfect information of the
parameter, robust control, and feedback control. We examined which policy induces
better outcome, and founded that the performance of policies depends on wheter the
policy is under commitment or discretion.
Section 2 introduces the structural model and considers the determinacy and learn-
ability condition of the model. Section 3 characterizes the policy problem under the
central bank’s uncertainty in the model under commitment and discretion. Section 4
conducts quantitative analysis of the former chapters, and section 5 expands the quan-
titative analysis in the case of a structural parameter varies over time. Finally, Section
6 gives concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 CTW (2011) New Keynesian Macroeconomic Model
In this section, we introduce the small-sized New Keynesian DSGE model of Chris-
tiano, Tranbandt, and Walentin (2011) (CTW). This model is composed with the IS-
Phillips curves with forward looking expectations. The economic system is composed
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with following two log-linearized equations.
(2.1) πt = κp[γ(1 + φ)xt +
ψ
(1− ψ)β + ψ it] + βEtπt+1




In equations (2.1)-(2.2), xt and πt denote the output gap and inflation, respectively.
it stands for nominal interest rate that is used as a policy variable of the central bank.
Equation (2.1) represents the relationship between inflation, expected inflation, and the
output gap around the steady state. These equations are log linearized versions of equi-
librium conditions derived from maximization procedures between competitive final
goods firm, monopoliscally competitive intermediate goods firms, and household. See
Christiano et al (2011).
In the above model, β, ψ, φ, γ, κp are parameters. β is subjective time discount rate,
which takes the value between 0 and 1. ψ ∈ [0, 1] represents the working capital channel
emphasized by Barth and Ramey (2002). If ψ = 0, the intermediate goods firms need
not require advanced financing for the cost of labor and input materials. If ψ = 1, full
amount of the cost must be financed at the beginning of the period. φ is the Frisch
inverse elasticity, the inverse of elasticity of the labor supply. γ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the
contribution of labor force in the production of intermediate goods. κp forms slope of




where ξp is the degree of price stickiness, which takes the value between 0 and 1. µ̂t,t+1
denotes the difference of technology shock from the steady state between period t + 1
and t, i.e., ẑt − ẑt+1, where logarithm of zt is the technology shock occuring in the
beginning of period t, and assume that it follows the first order autocorrelation process.
(2.4) ρz log zt + ut, ut : White noise N(0, σ2z ).
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2.2 Control under Perfect Information of ψ
From now on, we will represent ψ
(1−ψ)β+ψ as κψ, for notational convenience. Also,
we assume the monetary policy rule is expectational based rule (EBR), following the
suggestion of Evans and Honkaphoja (2003). First, consider the monetary policy un-
der discretion. Following Giannoni (2002)’s specification, let δ be the linear policy rule
(δ ∈ ∆ ⊂ Rn). Denote θ = (θ1, θ2, .., θm)′ the finite dimensional vector of structrual
parameters, such that θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rm. Denote vector of endogeneous variables at t such
as Ft = [πt, xt, it]. The stochastic process Ft should satisfy equations (2.1) and (2.2) at
all dates t. This can be written as follows
(2.5) G(F , θ) = 0
Then loss function of the controller can be denoted by L0(F , θ). So the control prob-
lem can be written as
(2.6) min
δ∈∆
E[L0(F (δ, θ), θ)]
Assume that the central bank seeks to minimize the following loss function.







((πt − π∗)2 + α(xt − x∗)2)
where π∗ = x∗ = 0, and α ∈ (0, 1).
Under the model without uncertainty of κψ, by using Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999)’s method for deriving optimal discretionary monetary policy, the policy rule
can be derived by solving following first order condition
(2.8) λ(π − π∗) + α(x− x∗) = 0
where λ = κpγ(1 + φ). Then policy under discretion becomes




λ2 + α− λκpκψ
, δπ =
λ2 + λβ + α




(λ2 + α)(ρz − 1)
γ(λ2 + α− λκpκψ)
.
If the policy is under commitment, the policy should be history dependent. Follow-
ing Taylor (1999)’s work, interest rate policy in this case becomes
(2.10) it = ξt(πt, πt−1, ..., xt, xt−1, ..., it−1, it−2, ...),
Using Evans and Honkapohja (2008)’s conclusion, commitment policy in our model
can be derived from following first order condition
(2.11) λ(πt − π∗) + α(xt − xt−1) = 0
Consequently, the commitment policy becomes
(2.12), ict = δ−1xt−1 + δxEtxt+1 + δπEtπt+1 + δz log zt
where δ−1 = − αγ(λ2+α−λκpκψ) . Other parameters are the same as in the discretionary
policy.
2.3 Determinacy and Learnability Condition
2.3.1 Under Discretion
Using the equation (2.9), substituting it to (2.2) and substituting this again into (2.1),
we get
(2.13) yt = α + BEtyt+1 + c log zt
where
yt = (πt, xt)′, Etyt+1 = (Etπt+1, Etxt+1)′
α = (0, 0)′, B =
(
κpγ(1 + φ)(1− δπ) + κpκψδπ + βκp γ(1 + φ)(1− δx) + κpκψδx






(ρz − 1)− δz) + κψδz),
1
γ
(ρz − 1)− δz)′.
Using Evans and Honkapohja (2001)’s method, the sufficient condition that system
(2.13) has a unique deterministic solution can be summarized by the following propo-
sition.
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Proposition 1. System (2.13) has an unique deterministic solution if all the eigen-
values of B are in a unit circle. That is,
(2.14) δπ <




−1− β + (κpκψ + β)δx
κpκψ
,
(2.16) (κpγ(1 + φ)− 2κpκψ(δ− 1) + (1 + β + κpκψ)δx < 2(1 + β + κpκψ),
(2.17) κpγ(1 + φ)(δπ − 1) + (1− β− κpκψ)δx > 0.
proo f : See Appendix A.1.
Thus, parameters γ, φ, ξp, ψ, β and policy parameters δπ, δx should be located in the
region made by equations (2.14)-(2.17). It implies that a central bank may not achieve
the rational expectation solution by controlling the policy parameters δπ, δx if param-
eters of the IS, Phillips curve γ, φ, ξp, ψ, β are located in the region outside the region
made by equations (2.14)-(2.17).
As can be seen in equations (2.1)-(2.2), private agents’ forward looking expectations
to period t + 1 influence inflation and the at the period t. In this section, we assume
that private agents don’t behave under rational expectations but under expectations
from bounded rationality, following the works of learning literatures. Private agents
do not know the exact values of the parameters of the model. Instead, they estimate
the parameters by using given information and use these estimates to form their ex-
pectations.
Now we consider the situation where private agents form a forward looking vector
Etyt+1 via adaptive expectation. Let recursive least square (RLS) learning rule be an
adaptive expectation procedure. The learnability condition is based on E-stability of
Minimum State Variable (MSV) solution. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
(2.18) yt = ā + k̄ log zt
11
where ā = (0, 0)′, k̄ = (I − ρzB)−1c. Then, private agents’ perceived law of motion
(PLM) and the actual law of motion (ALM) of the economy take the following forms:
(2.19) (PLM) Etyt+1 = at + ktρz log zt
(2.20) (ALM) yt = Bat + (ρBkt + c) log zt
The T- mapping from PLM to ALM is T(a, k) = (Ba, ρBk + c)′. Learnability is de-




= T(a, k)− (a, k)














According to the method of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the learnability (E-
stability) condition of the system can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The MSV solution (ā, k̄) is learnable if all eigenvalues of
( B− I 0
0 ρzBk− I
)
have real parts that are less than 1. That is,
(2.23) 2− κpγ(1 + φ)(1− δπ)− κpκψδπ − β− (1− δ) > 0
(2.24) κpγ(1 + φ)(δπ − 1) + (1− β− κpκψ)δx > 0.
Specifically, private agents’ PLM can be written as the following form:
(2.25) Etπt+1 = a1,t + k1,t log zt
(2.26) Etxt+1 = a2,t + k2,t log zt
Also, we will assume that private agents update their expectation values by decreasing-
gain recursive least square learning rule as follows.
(2.27) θ1,t = θ1,t−1 + t−1R−1t Xt(y1,t − θ′1,t−1Xt)′
12
(2.28) θ2,t = θ2,t−1 + t−1R−1t Xt(y2,t − θ′2,t−1Xt)′
(2.29) Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(XtX′t − Rt−1)
where
θi,t = (ai,t, ki,t)′, Xt = (1, log zt)′, y1,t = πt, y2,t = xt.
2.3.2 Under Commitment
Under the commitment policy (equation (2.11)), the system (2.1)-(2.2) becomes follow-
ing equation that contains predetermined endogeneous variable.
(2.30) yt = A + BEtyt+1 + Cyt−1 + D log zt
where
A = (0, 0)′, B =
(
κp(γ(1 + φ)(1− δπ) + κψδπ κp(γ(1 + φ)(1− δx) + κψδx





0 κpδ−1(κψ − γ(1 + φ))
0 −δ−1
)
, D = (κp((
1
γ




In this case, rational expectation solution is given by (a, b, c) in the following equation.
(2.31) yt = a + byt−1 + c log zt
Following (2.31), private forms expectation values, thus Etyt+1 = (I − b)a + b2yt−1 +
(bc + cρz) log zt Thus equation (2.31) can be represented as follows.
(2.32) yt = B(I − b)a + (Bb2 + C)yt−1 + (Bbc + Bcρz + D) log zt
In this circumstance, RE solution (a, b, c) should satisfy the following three conditions
by applying Evans and Honkapohja (2001)’s argument.
(2.33) (I − B− Bb)a = 0
(2.34) Bb2 − b + C = 0
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(2.35) (I − Bb)C− BCρz = Dρz
by using Uhlig’s (1999) method of indeterminate coefficient, we can get (a, b, c). Re-
mark that solution b need not be unique, since b2 in equation (2.34) implies it can be
multiple solution.
The mapping from the PLM to the ALM takes the form
(2.36) T(a, b, c) = ((B0 + B1 + B1b)a, B1b2 + B0b + c, (B0c + B1bc + B1cρz + Dρz))




= T(a, b, c)− (a, b, c)
The fixed points of equation (2.37) give MSV solution. Following Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001), a particular MSV solution (ā, b̄, c̄) is learnable if the MSV fixed point of
the equation.(2.37) is locally asymptotically stable at that point. Mathematically, the









(Bb), and B + Bb have real parts less than 1.
Let private agents don’t know exact solution of (a, b, c) of equation (2.31). Under
the Adaptive learning, private agent estimates unknown parameters of the model us-
ing current information and updates the estimates when new information is obtained.
The private’s model in period t takes the form
(2.38) yt = at + btyt−1 + ct log zt





, ct = (c1,t, c2,t)′. Under the RLS learning
with decreasing gain, the parameters are updated as following fomular.
(2.39) θt = θt−1 + t−1R−1t Xt−1(yt − θ′t−1Xt−1)′
(2.40) Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(Xt−1X′t−1 − Rt−1)
where θt =
 a1,t a2,tb11,t b21,t
b12,t b22,t
c1,t c2,t
, Xt−1 = (1, πt−1, xt−1, log zt)′. Thus, private agents’ expec-
tion of y from t to t + 1 takes the from
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(2.41) Etyt+1 = at + btat + b2t yt−1 + (btct + ctρz) log zt.
More generally containing the both of cases of discretion and commitment, private
agents’ subjective model can be rewritten as
(2.42) yt = θ′t−1Xt−1 + ηt
where error ηt has a mean zero property. That is, the errors are believed to be orthog-
onal to the regressor Xt−1. Thus, with the private agents’ subjective expectation, the
orthogonality condition can be expressed as
(2.43) E[Xt−1(yt − θ′t−1Xt−1)′] = 0.
Even if the private agents’ model is misspecified, when t−1 → 0, this belief induces the
self confirming equilibrium (SCE). This convergence in beliefs can be written by the
following ordinary differential equations (ODE).
(2.44) θ̇ = R−1 ḡ(θ)
(2.45) Ṙ = [M̄(θ)− R]
where ḡ(θ) = Xt−1(yt− θ′t−1Xt−1)′, and M̄(θ) = Xt−1X′t−1. This convergence in beliefs
is called mean dynamics in Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002).
3 Policy rules of Central Bank
3.1 Parameter Uncertainty of ψ as a Kind of Structural Uncertainty
In the model, we will assume that central bank is unaware of the exact value of pa-
rameter ψ (let true ψ is fixed). Central bank doesn’t know its distribution, either. Thus,
the Knightian uncertainty exists in this model. The rationalization of this assumption,
although it could be ad hoc, can be thought in the following way: In real world, the
degree of external financing of the intermediate goods firm (ψ) depends on the firm’s
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financial status and the shock of the financial market. However, this information are
the intermediate firm’s inside information, so it would be hard for the central bank
to know the information, even if the central bank knows the whole structure of the
economy. This idea is the case of the asymmetric partial information of Svensson and
Woodford (2003). In this case, central bank merely knows the fact that ψ ∈ [0, 1], and
does not know where the value is located.
In this case, the central bank could take actions in two ways. First, it could be think
of the worst-case scenario caused by parameter ψ and derive the policy that can mini-
mize the worst case. Second, using information and structure of the economy that the
central bank can use, he could estimate and update the value of ψ. This two policy rules
can be called robust policy, and f eedback policy, respectively. In the next two following
subsections, we will derive these two policies.
3.2 Robust Control Policy
We will now turn our head to robust control policy under the uncertainty of param-
eter ψ. Generally, robust control problem under parameter uncertainty can be written





E[L0(F (δ, θ), θ)]
Then, following Giannoni(2002), the pair (δ∗, θ∗) forms Nash equilibrium profile if
the pair satisfies the following two conditions simultaneously.
(3.2) δ∗ = arg min
δ∈∆
L(F (δ, θ∗), θ∗)
(3.3) θ∗ = arg max
θ∈Θ
L(F (δ∗, θ), θ)
In our CTW model, under the uncertainty of the parameter ψ (connected to the












((πt − π∗)2 + α(xt − x∗)2)
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with constraint (2.1) and (2.2). Then, central bank’s robust policy rule can be derived by
the following step. First, solve the loss maximization parameter (by malevolent nature)
κ∗ψ. The solution can be represented by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let the centeral bank perceive boundary of κψ as [κψmin, κψmax] and
let κ∗ψ be the malevolent nature’s solution. Then κ
∗
ψ is
(3.5) κ∗ψ = κψmax if γ(1 + φ) > κψmax
(3.6) κ∗ψ = κψmin if γ(1 + φ) < κψmax
proo f . See Appendix A.2.
Second, given κ∗ψ, derive control policy (as we did in the above section). Then the
robust policy under discretion can be derived by
















. In this case, it is evident
that
δrx ≥ δx, δrπ ≥ δπ.
In Taylor (1998)’s work, it was propsed that the coefficient δπ should be greater than
1. This means that the interest rate should be raised more than the degree of increase
of the inflation rate. This aggresive interest rate policy is called Taylor principle. In
this sense, equation (3.7) implies that central bank reacts more aggressively against ex-
pected values of inflation and output gap when he is uncertain about the true value of
ψ. It can be summerized that the central bank holds more strict Taylor principle when
it executes robust control policy. Proposition 3 also holds in the case of commitment,
and the robust control policy under commitment becomes














3.3 Feedback Control Policy
After central bank observes private agents’ expectation values and state variables
[πt−1, xt−1, log zt], central bank estimates κψ using his known Philips curve (equation
(2.1)), via following Kalman filter algorithm.




(3.10) Σt = Pt − PtF′t (Vt + FtPtFt)−1Ft
where
Ft = κpit, V = 0.01, Gt = I,
Pt = GtΣt−1G′t + W, Wt = 0.1,
et = πt − κtγ(1 + φ)xt − βEtπt+1, and θ = κψ.
Then central bank’s feedback policy rule under discretion becomes:
















Also, feedback policy rule under commitment is









where δk−1,t = −
α
γ(λ2+α−λκpκ̂ψ)
. In the following section, we conduct numerical analysis
on the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables and their stability.
4 Quantitative Analysis I
In the quantitative analysis, we followed the Christiano et al (2011)’s calibration
when assigning values for some structural parameter. We set β = 0.99, κp = 0.0858 (i.e., ξp =
0.75), ρz = 0.9, and α = 0.1. We set φ = 1 arbitrarily, since with this value, the sys-
tem is more likely to achieve determinacy. Also we assume that technology shock
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σz = 0.01. In the case of ψ and γ, we moved the range of two parameters between
ψ ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0.5, 1]. In the quantitative analysis, we compared three policies (perfect
information policy, robust policy, and feedback policy) under discretion and commit-
ment.
β Discount factor 0.95
ξp Degree of price stickiness 0.75
α Relative weight for output deviations 0.1
φ Frisch inverse elaticity 1
ρz AR(1) coefficient of technology 0.9
σz Standard deviation of technology shock 0.01
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
4.1 Case 1: Under Discretion
Figures 1 shows the results under discretionary policy when ψ is fixed to 0.25 and
γ = 0.7. As it can be seen in Figure 1, inflation and output gap tend to move around
near with stationary process (but cannot reach to it), as time goes on, in all three poli-
cies. However, it also can be seen that the inflation in the robust policy is generally
below that of the perfect information policy and feedback policy. On the other hand,
output gap in the robust policy is generally above that of the other policies. Inflation
and output gap in the feedback policy are located between the results of the other two
policies. Remark that outcomes from adaptive learning converge to specific values by
learnability or orthogonality conditions, even if it is not a rational expectations equi-
librium. Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and Evans and Honkapohja (2008) show that
there would be a large difference in the cooperation between two sectors when central
bank uses fundamental based rule (FBR) whereas private agents have bounded ratio-
nality. Since these three policies use expectational based rules (EBR), there is not much
instability in this outcome. It seems rather peculiar that robust policy can induce better
realizations than the perfect information control policy.
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This outcome can be explained by two factors. First, this is because the central bank
performs discretionary policy and private agents’ expectation is bounded rational.
Central bank performs aggressive monetary policy under the parameter uncertainty.
As can be seen from section 3.2, the central bank’s policy coefficients δx, δπ are bigger
than those of the perfect information policy. This policy induces private agents’ belief
of future inflation rate and the output gap is lower than the those under the perfect
information policy.
In fact, the total loss of three policies vary when the parameter moves. Figure 2






t ) when ψ moves (given γ). It reports
that the difference of loss of three policies reduces as ψ approaches 1. Next, Figure 3
shows that the total loss of policies when γ moves (given ψ = 0.25). Results show that
the total loss is decreasing when γ approches 1. In fact, ψ → 0 and γ → 1 imply that
the Phillips curve reduces to the curve of the classic New Keynesian model.
4.2 Case 2: Under Commitment
The former performance that robust policy has better outcomes than the perfect in-
formation control policy (and feedback policy) no longer holds in the commitment pol-
icy. Figure 4 shows that dynamics of inflation and output gap is minimized when the
central bank performs perfect information policy. Despite some fluctuations in early
periods, inflation rate and output gap are moving around zero (steady state), whereas
those under robust policy are slightly dislocated. The outcomes under feedback policy
are similiar to those of the perfect information policy.
Figure 5 shows that difference of total loss between robust policy and perfect infor-
mation policy remains nonnegative within the range of ψ ∈ [0, 1] and the descrepancy
is maximized when the true ψ = 0. Also, Figure 6 shows that as γ becomes smaller, the
total loss under robust policy increases steeply, and the loss under feedback policy is
almost similar to that of perfect information policy. These results show that the perfor-
mance of the robust policy is the worst among the three policies under commitment,
whereas that of the perfect information is the best. It also shows that feedback policy
is quite effective to catch up the outcome of the perfect information policy.
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5 Quantitative Analysis II
5.1 Random Walk of ψ
In this section, we expand the model from section 2 and consider a model that reflects
the case where an economy evolves with time varying parameters. This modification
may be justified economically as follows. In the real world, the firms’ degree of external
finance is not constant, but varies depending on the conditions of financial market.
We assume that the shock of the financial market is exogenous with continuous state
space and the status of the financial market has inertia. Then ψ becomes a time varying
paramter ψt with its shock is continuous random variable.
However, it is quite difficult to impose stochastic property on ψ directly. This is be-
cause, if we construct ψt, it is computationally difficult to identify the stochastic char-
acter of κψ,t =
ψt
(1−ψt)β+ψt . Even if we assume that the shock of ψt is in a familiar para-
metric family (e.g. normal distribution), inducing the law of motion of κψ,t analytically






((1− ψ)β + ψ)2 > 0,
the κψ is a monotone increasing function of ψ. In addition, the range of κψ,t is identical
to ψ, that is, [0,1]. Thus, it can be thought that the law of motion of κψ,t follows the key
feature of law of motion of ψt. Thus it could be justified that imposing stochastic pro-
cess of κψ,t directly as an approximation of ψt is not ad hoc. By adding certain stochastic
properties to key parameters that determine the economic processes, the entire model
now harbors a probabilistic uncertainty.
Let’s assume that κψ,t follows truncated random walk process as follows.
(5.1) κψ,t = ρψκψ,t−1 + εψ,t, εψ,t ∼ w.n.N(0, σ2ψ,t) if 0 ≤ κψ,t ≤ 1
= 0 if κψ,t < 0
= 1 if κψ,t > 1.
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5.2 Case 1: Under Discretion
Simulation studies tell that the general features are not so different from those when
ψ is a fixed parameter. Robust policy outperforms perfect information policy, even if ψt
is a time varying parameter. Figure 7 and Figure 10 are similar to Figure 1 and Figure
3.
This reveals that the effect of aggresive policy rule caused by robust control still
works in the case of time varying property of κψ,t, since the monetary policies lack
commitment and private agents’ expectaions are come from bounded rationality.
Another notable feature is that feedback policy is very effective to catch up ψt’s
behavior. In fact, it is well-known that Kalman filter algorithm is effective to estimate
time varying parameter when the state space is continuous, the law of motion of the
parameter is linear, and the random shock of the parameter is not far from the Gaussian
shock. As it can be seen in Figure 8, κ̂ψ,t successfully catch up the real behavior of κt.
Consequently, the coefficients form linear policy function δ−1,t, δx,t, δπ,t, and δz,t in the
perfect information policy and feedback policy have almost same movements. Figure
9 shows this result. Finally, Figure 10 shows that the total loss of three policies decrease
as γ goes to 1, as in the case of fixed ψ.
5.3 Case 2: Under Commitment
As in section 4.2, in the case of policy with commitment, in the Figure 11, the main
feature that the robust policy is inferior to that of the perfect information policy and
the feedback policy is unchanged, even if ψt is time varying.
In addition, as it can be seen from Figure 12 and Figure 13, κ̂ψ,t of the feedback
policy successfully catches up the real behavior of κψ,t, so the time varying policy co-
efficients of the feedback policy also catches up those of the perfect information policy.




In this paper, we examined the effects of monetary policy under the bounded ra-
tionality and parameter uncertainty. Under the CTW (2011)’s New Keynesian model,
private agents form expected values based on bounded rationality, and central bank
has uncertainty about the degree of internal financing of intermediate goods firm. We
examined which policy induces better outcome between perfect information, robust,
and feedback policy.
The rank of performance between three policies depends on whether the policy
is under commitment or not. In the discretionary policy, robust control policy shows
the best performance among the three policies, within the framework of loss function
minimization. On the other hand, robust control policy shows the worst performance
among three poilcies with commitment. Also, performance of perfect information pol-
icy and the feedback policy with commitment outperform that of discretionary poli-
cies.
This result gives following implications. First, the importance of commitment in the
aspect of stabilization of the economy. Commitment policy that is history dependent
can induce more stable economy with lower inflation rate and output gap near steady
state. Second, desirable attitude of central bank to deal with imperfect information of
the economy. If central bank conducts commitment policy, feedback action is strongly
required; central bank must try to know ψ using available information. However, if
central bank wants to conduct discretionary policy, central bank’s action to minimize
the worst-case scenario induces better outcomes than the perfect information policy,
whether central bank intended or not.
The contributions of this paper are in the following. First of all, this paper is the
first paper that studied issue of bounded rationality in the CTW’s modified New Key-
nesian structural model. Deriving perfect information, robust, feedback policies under
commitment and discretion, and deriving determinacy and learnability condition of
the model are innate achievements of this study. Second, the study considered robust
control, feedback control, learning, and commitment problem together, that was not
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done in the previous studies. It is our inventive finding that with imperfect informa-
tion of economic agents, the rank of performance between robust policy and feedback
policy is switched subject to the existence of commitment.
Of course, this paper has some limitations. The policies are not derived by fully
dynamic way. Since private agents’ forward looking expectation does not come from
rational expectation, it is very hard to solve dynamic programming entirely. Thus we
derived policies via somewhat static methods as a makeshift. Also, we solved robust
control problem in the case of parameter uncertainty, and the Hansen and Sargent




A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic equation of matrix B in the equation (2.5) can be represented as
det(B−ωI) = 0. That is,
(A.1.1) ω2 + a1ω + a0
where
a1 = −(κpγ(1 + φ)(1− δπ) + κpκψδπ + 1− δx + β),
a2 = (1− δx)β + κpκψ(δπ − δx).
According to LaSalle (1986), the following two conditions should be satisfied if the
roots of equation (A.1.1) (eigenvalues of B) would inside in unit circle.
(1) |a0| < 1,
(2) |a1| < 1 + a0
The inequalities (2.14) and (2.15) are derived from the condition (1), and the inequalities
(2.16) and (2.17) are derived from the condition (2).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The characteristic equation of matrix B− I can be represented as det(B− (ω+ 1)I) = 0.
That is,
(A.2.1) ω2 + b1ω + b1
where
b1 = (2− κpγ(1 + φ)(1− δπ)− κpκψδπ − (1− δx)− β),
b0 = κpγ(1 + φ)(δ− 1) + (1− β− κpκψ)δx
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To MSV solutions have learnability (e-stability), the all of eigenvalues should be smaller
than 0. Thus, −b1±
√
b21 − 4b0 < 0 should hold. By using Routh theorm, the necessary
and sufficient conditions are b1 > 0 and b2 > 0. When calculate these conditions, equa-
tion (2.23) and (2.24) are derived.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.
Let L(δ∗(θ), θ) be the total loss of central bank given the optimal policy rule and pa-
rameters of system (2.1)-(2.2). Following Lemma 3 of Ginannoni (2002), the worst-case
κ∗ψ (chosen by malevolent nature) is
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(A.3.7)










λ2 + α− λκpκψ
Etxt+1 +
α(κpκψ + β)
λ2 + α− λκpκψ
Etπt+1 +
κpκψ(1− ρz)(λ2 − λ2 − α)
γ(λ2 + α− λκpκψ)
log zt
when we combine equation (A.3.4)-(A.3.7), the two inequality conditions (3.5) and
(3.6) are derived.
A.4. Kalman filter
In this paper, we assume the parameter κψ to be time-varying to reflect the un-
certainty of an economy. In this case, using the RLS learning method is inappropriate
because it does not recognize the probabilistic property of the parameters. Rather, the
Bayesian learning method, in which the previously obtained probability distribution
of a parameter is combined with the posterior probability distribution should be used
to accurately cover the context.
Kalman (1960) suggested an effective method, referred to as the Kalman filter, to
estimate parameter under such parametric uncertainty using Bayesian methodology.
In estimating the parameter κψ and coefficients of the private sector a1,t, a2,t, d1,t, k1,t and
k2,t, this paper uses the Kalman filter algorithm. Instead of Kalman (1960), this paper
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follows the guidance of Chow (1984) and Meinhold and Sinpurwalla (1983). According
to the algorithm, updates of time-varying parameters are performed as follows.
In the central bank’s case, the desired parameter (κψ)′ = θt can be arranged in the
form of an observation equation:
(A.4.1) Yt = Ftθt + vt
where Yt = (y1,t, y2,t), F = I2, vt ∼ N(0, I2)
Now the system equation of parameter :
(A.4.2) θt = Gtθt−1 + wt
where Gt = I2, ωt ∼ N(0, I2)
Using Bayes’ theorem, the posterior distribution of θt after Yt = (y1,t, y2,t)′ is ob-
served can be expressed as the product of the prior distribution of θt based on the
observations up to time t− 1, and the likelihood function of Yt. To illustrate:
(A.4.3) P(θt|Yt) ∝ P(Yt|θt, Yt−1)× P(θt|Yt−1)
Meanwhile the conditional probability function of parameter θt−1 at time t − 1 is
expressed as follows:
(A.4.4) (θt−1|Yt−1) ∼ N(θ̂t−1, Σt−1)
Upon this recursive relationship of the parameter’s conditional probability distri-
bution, the posterior distribution can be calculated using Bayesian estimation. At time
t− 1 when Yt is not observed, the conditional probability function of θt is (θt|Yt−1) ∼
N(Gtθ̂t−1, Rt = GtΣt−1G′t +Wt). And this serves as a prior distribution of the Bayesian
estimation at time t. Next, the likelihood function P(Yt|θt, Yt−1) is determined, where
the prediction error of Yt, namely et, is as follows.
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(A.4.5) et = Yt − Ŷt = Yt − FtGtθ̂t−1.
Since FtGtθt−1|t−1 is observed in the initial condition and prior times, observing Yt
would be equivalent to observing et. Thus P(Yt|θt, Yt−1) = P(et|θt, Yt−1) and (et|θt, Yt−1) ∼
N(Ft(θt−Gtθ̂t−1), Vt) are hence obtainable. Based on this, the posterior distribution af-
ter observation of Yt can be arranged as follows:




Equation (A.4.6) shows the typical relationship in Bayes’ theorem. However, there
is a complication in calculating the right-hand side of the equation, the product of
the distributions and the integral of a distribution in parametric space. Thus, in this
paper, we utilize the method of Meinhold and Singpurwalla (1983) in calculating the
left-hand side, the posterior distribution, P(θt|Yt, Yt−1) Using the property of bivariate
normal distributions, the probability vector would be (X1, X2‘)′ ∼ N((µ1, µ2)′, Σ) and
under the condition of X2 = x2, X1 would be
(A.4.7) (X1|X2 = x2) ∼ N(µ1 + Σ12Σ−122 (x2‘− µ2), Σ11 − Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21)
If we transform the probability vector (X1,X2)′ into (θt, et)′, then µ1 = Gtθ̂t−1, σ11 =
Rt, µ2 = 0, and Σ21 = FtRt, Σ22 = Vt + FtRtF′t . By directly using these values, the
posterior distribution P(θt|Yt, Yt−1) can be expressed as follows:
(A.4.8) (θt|Yt, Yt−1) = (θt|et, Yt−1) ∼ N(θ̂t, Σt)




(A.4.10) Σt = Rt − RtF′t (Vt + FtRtF′t )−1FtRt
29
The vector Kt = RtF′t (Vt + FtRtF
′
t )
−1 is called a Kalman gain. By setting the initial
values θ̂0, Σ0 and using the same algorithm, we can simulate the expected value of the
posterior distribution θ̂t = κ̂ψ, which will be used by the central bank to determine the
interest rate. In this paper, σ0 = I1 and θ̂0 are set as various values satisfying each of
the parameter properties. All results were similar and this paper introduces the results
drawn by setting ψ0 = 0.25.
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Appendix B: Figures
Figure 1: Dynamics of realized inflation πt+1 (Top) and the output gap xt+1 (Bottom)
under discretion (ψ = 0.25, γ = 0.7)
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Figure 2: Total loss of policies with ψ ∈ [0, 1] under discretion (γ = 0.7)
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Figure 3: Total loss of policies with γ ∈ [0.5, 1] under discretion
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Figure 4: Dynamics of realized inflation πt+1 (Top) and the output gap xt+1 (Bottom)
under commitment (ψ = 0.25, γ = 0.7)
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Figure 5: Total loss of policies with ψ ∈ [0, 1] under commitment (γ = 0.7)
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Figure 6: Toal loss of policies with γ ∈ [0.5, 1] under commitment (ψ = 0.25)
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Figure 7: Dynamics of realized inflation πt+1 (Top) and the output gap xt+1 (Bottom)
with time varying κψ,t under discretion (γ = 0.7)
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Figure 8: Dynamics of κψ,t and its estimate κ̂ψ,t under discretion
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Figure 9: Dynamics of monetary policy coefficient δx,t (Top), δπ,t (Middle) and δz,t (Bot-
tom) with time varying κψ,t under discretion
39
Figure 10: Total loss of policies with γ ∈ [0.5, 1] and time varying κψ,t under discretion
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Figure 11: Dynamics of realized inflation πt+1 (Top) and the output gap xt+1 (Bottom)
with time varying κψ,t under commitment (γ = 0.7)
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Figure 12: Dynamics of κψ,t and its estimate κ̂ψ,t under commitment
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Figure 13: Dynamics of monetary policy coefficient δx,t (Top), δπ,t (Middle) and δz,t
(Bottom) with time varying κψ,t under commitment
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국문초록
본 논문에서는 경제주체가 제한적 합리성을 지니며 행위하고 경제 내 구
조적 모수에 불확실성이 존재할 경우, 통화정책의 성격에 따른 경제의 동학
적 효과에 대한 연구를 수행하였다. 본 논문에서 사용한 기본 모형은
Christiano, Tranbandt, Walentin (2011)의 IS곡선-필립스 곡선으로 구성된
새 케인즈 모형이다. 본 논문에서는 모형에 추가로 1) 민간 경제주체가 미래
경제변수에 대한 기댓값을 적응적 기대를 통하여 형성하고, 2) 중앙은행은
새 케인즈 필립스곡선을 구성하는 유동자본경로 (working capital chanel) 모
수를 불확실하게 인지하고 있다는 가정을 추가하였다. 이러한 불확실성 속에
서 중앙은행의 정책함수를 도출하는 방법으로 견실제어 (robust control), 베
이지안 학습 알고리즘의 두 방법론을 사용하였다. 본 논문에서는 유동자본경
로 모수에 대한 완전정보 하에서의 중앙은행의 통화정책, 모수를 불확실하게
인지하고 있는 상황에서의 견실제어 정책과 피드백 (베이지안) 정책을 도출
하고, 세 정책의 동학적 효과를 확인하기 위해 정량분석을 수행하였다. 분석
결과, 중앙은행이 목표로 하는 ‘손실함수 최소화’의 기준에서, 재량적 통화정
책의 정책기조 하에서는 견실제어 정책이 세 정책 중 가장 나은 성과를 보
인 반면, 통화정책의 신뢰성 (commitment) 이 담보될 경우에는 견실제어 정
책이 가장 열등한 결과를 나타내었다. 또한, 통화정책의 신뢰성이 담보될 경
우, 경제 안정화 및 손실함수 최소화의 측면에서, 완전정보 정책과 이를 잘
모사하는 피드백 정책의 성과가 재량적 정책 하에서의 두 정책의 성과를 압
도하는 결과가 나타났다.
주요어: 견실제어, 불확실성, 통화정책, 정책 신뢰성, 피드백 제어, 학습
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